The Role of Risk Aversion in Predicting Individual Behaviour by Monica Paiella & Luigi Guiso
The Role of Risk Aversion in Predicting
Individual Behaviour ¤
Luigi Guiso y Monica Paiella z
First draft 24.7.03; This draft 12.1.2004
Abstract
We use household survey data to construct a direct measure of
absolute risk aversion based on the maximum price a consumer is will-
ing to pay to buy a risky asset. We relate this measure to a set of
consumers’ decisions that in theory should vary with attitude towards
risk. We …nd that elicited risk aversion has considerable predictive
power for a number of key household decisions such as choice of occu-
pation, portfolio selection, moving decisions and exposure to chronic
diseases in ways consistent with theory. We also use this indicator to
address the importance of self-selection when relating indicators of risk
to individual saving decisions.
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11 Introduction
The theory of choice under uncertainty implies that the attitude an individ-
ual has towards risk is decisive in a variety of contexts that are critical for
understanding individual behavior. According to theory, di¤erences in risk
aversion among individuals should show up sharply in their occupational
choices, their decisions on how to allocate accumulated assets, how much
insurance to buy in the market and how much to self-insure. In some cases
- as in simple portfolio theory (Samuelson, 1969, Merton, 1969, and Gollier,
2001) - theory goes so far as to imply that all the di¤erences across indi-
viduals in observed portfolio composition should re‡ect di¤erences in risk
preferences. Thus, the well-documented massive heterogeneity in portfolio
shares across households1 could all be traced back to such di¤erences. More
generally, di¤erences in risk aversion should a¤ect individuals’ investment
choices with the more risk-averse being ready to forego relatively higher ex-
pected returns for returns with lower variability. The immediate implication
is that more risk-averse individuals should have less variable earnings but
end up, on average, poorer. One key question then is how much of the in-
equality in income and wealth distribution can be due to di¤erences across
individuals in their risk preferences. The answer clearly depends on how
much the attitudes towards risk di¤er across consumers and how important
risk aversion is in explaining behavior vis-à-vis other income determinants
that may themselves di¤er signi…cantly across individuals. In order to be
able to provide evidence on these issues one needs to be able to measure risk
aversion at the individual level. However, individual willingness to bear risk
is not normally observable; this is one reason why researchers have typically
assumed that individuals have identical risk preferences and so explained
the observed di¤erences in behavior and wealth by assuming some form of
market friction or imperfection that a¤ects individuals di¤erentially.2
This paper makes two contributions to help sort out the role of di¤er-
ences in risk preferences. First, we employ information on households’ will-
ingness to pay for a hypothetical risky security contained in the 1995 Bank
of Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), to recover a mea-
sure of the Arrow-Pratt index of absolute risk aversion of the consumer’s
lifetime utility function and check how much measured risk aversion dif-
1Se Guiso, Haliassos and Jappelli (2001).
2For instance, inequalities in income and wealth have been related to limited access to
…nancial markets either because of …xed costs of investing in assets with high expected
yield (Guvenen, 2002) or because of rationing in credit markets arising from information
and commitment problems (Cagetti and De Nardi, 2002).
2fers across individuals. Second, we relate this measure to various behaviors
that according to theory should be greatly a¤ected by risk preferences. In
particular, we focus on individuals’ occupational and portfolio choices, their
demand for insurance, their investment in education, the propensity to move
or change jobs and their exposure to chronic diseases. We …nd unequivocal
evidence that risk preferences di¤er considerably across individuals and that
these di¤erences have substantial explanatory power as regards individual
decisions.
Although the vast majority of the survey participants are risk-averse
according to our measure, a small proportion (4 percent) are either risk-
neutral or risk-loving (we will call this group “risk-prone”); furthermore,
even among the risk-averse there is a lot of heterogeneity in the degree of
risk aversion, which shows that preferences for risk do di¤er signi…cantly
across individuals. Furthermore, these di¤erences are systematically related
to individual choices that involve risk. Di¤erences in risk preferences are
important for understanding di¤erences in behavior across individuals. For
instance, compared to the risk-prone, the risk-averse are 9 percentage points
less likely to be self-employed (corresponding to 50 percent of the sample
share of the self-employed), have a 10-point lower chance of holding risky
securities (corresponding to 70 percent of the sample mean), and have, on
average, 110,000 euros less in total net worth, 75% of the sample mean.
Correspondingly, individuals with a low degree of risk aversion (at the 10th
percentile of the cross-sectional distribution) face earnings that are 60%
more variable than those of highly risk-averse individuals (90th percentile).
Our …ndings imply that individuals sort themselves out in such a way
that the highly risk-averse face less risky prospects. This self-selection makes
it problematic to assess the e¤ect of risk on choice, an issue that arises, for
instance, in evaluating the e¤ect of income uncertainty on investment in
risky assets or testing for precautionary savings. The problem here is that
the risk that agents face is correlated with preferences for risk that are
unobservable. This unobserved preference heterogeneity biases - normally
towards zero - the measured e¤ect of risk. Since we observe risk preferences
directly, we can assess the importance of self-selection for estimates of the
e¤ect of risk on behavior, and we do this with reference to precautionary
saving.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our
measure of risk aversion. Section 3 presents descriptive evidence on risk
aversion and individuals’ choices in our cross-section of households. In Sec-
tion 4 we summarize what theory says about the e¤ect of risk aversion on a
number of household decisions: occupational choice, portfolio allocation, in-
3surance demand, investment in education, moving and job change. Section
5 presents the results of the estimates. In Section 6 we look more closely
at the link between attitudes towards risk and the mean and variance of in-
dividual income. Section 7 discusses self-selection induced by risk attitudes
and illustrates its relevance for precautionary savings estimates. Section 8
concludes.
2 Measuring risk aversion
To measure risk aversion we exploit the 1995 wave of the Survey of House-
hold Income and Wealth (SHIW), which is run every two years by the Bank
of Italy. The 1995 SHIW collects data on income, consumption, real and
…nancial wealth and its composition, insurance demand, type of occupa-
tion, educational attainment, geographic and occupational mobility, and
several demographic variables for a representative sample of 8,135 Italian
households. Balance-sheet items are end-of-period values. Income and ‡ow
variables refer to 1995.3
The 1995 survey had a section designed to elicit attitudes towards risk.
Each participant was o¤ered a hypothetical negotiable asset and was asked to
report the maximum price that he would be willing to pay for it. Speci…cally:
“We would like to ask you a hypothetical question that you
should answer as if the situation were a real one. You are o¤ered
the opportunity of acquiring an asset permitting you, with the
same probability, either to gain 10 million lire or to lose your
entire investment all the capital invested. What is the most that
you would be prepared to pay for this asset?”
Ten million lire is roughly equal to 5,000 euros. The expected gain from
the investment is equal to 16 percent of average household’s annual con-
sumption. Thus, the investment represents a relatively large risk. Putting
consumers face-to-face with a relatively large investment is a better strategy
to elicit risk attitudes when one relies, as we do, on expected utility maxi-
mization to characterize risk aversion. In fact, expected utility maximizers
behave risk-neutrally with respect to small risks even if they are averse to
larger risks (Arrow, 1970). The interviews are conducted personally at the
consumer’s home by professional interviewers. To help the respondent un-
derstand the question, the interviewers showed an illustrative card and were
3The appendix describes the survey contents, sample design, interviewing procedure
and response rates in more detail.
4ready to provide explanations. The respondent could respond in one of three
ways: a) declare the maximum amount he was willing to pay for the asset,
which we denote Zi; b) answer “don’t know”; c) not answer.
Notice that the way the hypothetical asset is designed implies that with
probability 1/2 the respondent gets 10 million lire and with probability 1/2
he loses Zi: So the expected value of the lottery is 1=2(10 ¡ Zi): Clearly,
Zi < 10 million lire, Zi = 10, and Zi > 10 million lire imply risk aversion,
risk neutrality and risk loving, respectively. This characterizes attitudes
towards risk qualitatively. Within the expected utility framework a measure
of the Arrow-Pratt index of absolute risk aversion can also be obtained for
each consumer. Let wi denote household i0s endowment. Let ui(¢) be its
(lifetime) utility function and e Pi be the random return on the security for
individual i, taking values 10 million and ¡Zi with equal probability. The




ui(wi + 10) +
1
2
ui(wi ¡ Zi) = Eui(wi + e Pi); (1)
where E is the expectations operator. Taking a second-order Taylor expan-
sion of the right-hand side of (1) around wi gives:
Eui(wi + e Pi) h ui(wi) + u0
i(wi)E(e Pi) + 0:5u00
i(wi)E(e Pi)2: (2)
Substituting (2) into (1) and simplifying we obtain:
Ri(wi) h ¡u00
i(wi)=u0






Equation (3) uniquely de…nes the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aver-
sion in terms of the parameters of the hypothetical asset of the survey. Obvi-
ously, for risk-neutral individuals (i.e. those reporting Zi = 10), Ri(wi) = 0
and for the risk-prone (those with Zi > 10), Ri(wi) < 0. Notice that since
the loss Zi or the gain from the investment need not be fully borne by or
bene…t current consumption but may be spread over lifetime consumption,
our measure of risk aversion is better interpreted as the risk aversion of the
consumer’s lifetime utility.4
A few comments on this measure and on how it compares with those
used in other studies are in order. First, our measure requires no assump-
tion on the form of the individual utility function, which is left unspeci…ed.
Second, it is not restricted to risk-averse individuals but extends to the risk-
neutral and the risk lovers. Third, our de…nition provides a point estimate,
4In a related paper (see Guiso and Paiella, 2001) we study the shape and determinants
of the risk aversion function.
5rather than a range, of the degree of risk aversion for each individual in the
sample. These features distinguish our study from that of Barsky, Juster,
Kimball and Shapiro (1997) who only obtain a range measure of (relative)
risk aversion and a point estimate under the assumption that preferences
are strictly risk-averse and utility is of the CRRA type. However, their
elicitation strategy allows them to recover a measure of the risk aversion of
period utility instead of lifetime utility as we do. In this regard, our and
their study should be viewed as complementary.5
3 Descriptive evidence
The question on the risky asset was submitted to the whole sample of 8,135
heads of household, but only 3,458 answered and were willing to purchase
the asset. Of the 4,677 who did not, 1,586 answered “do not know” and
3,091 refused to answer or to pay a positive price (25 o¤ered more than 20
million). This is likely to be due to the complexity of the question, which
might have led some participants to skip it altogether because of the rela-
tively long time required to understand its meaning and provide an answer.
No-responses also re‡ect the fact that the question was asked abruptly by
the interviewers, not prepared for by “warm up” questions. However, this
strategy has its advantages: …rst, the framing and timing of the introduc-
tory questions could a¤ect the response to the main question, thus distorting
the measure of the true preference parameter. Second, the abrupt approach
avoids noise respondents (i.e. those with a poor understanding of the ques-
tion), as would probably happen with “warm up” questions. Thus, while the
high non-response rate signals that the question is complex and there may
be cognitive problems, it does not mean that those who chose to respond
gave erroneous answers. This is not to say that our gauge of risk aversion
is free of measurement error. However, if this is of the classical type, it will
bias our results towards …nding small e¤ects of risk aversion on behavior.
Thus, our estimates should be regarded as lower bounds of the true e¤ects
of risk preferences on consumer decisions.6
5Tiseno (2002) shows that knowledge of the maximum subjective price function for a
risk is su¢cient to identify the risk aversion of a consumer lifetime utility. He also shows
that under certain conditions the risk aversion of lifetime utility and that of period utility
are proportional.
6The reported prices are likely to be a¤ected by a well known problem in experimental
economics: individuals asked to price hypothetical lotteries (or risky assets) tend to report
lower buying than selling prices (see Kagel and Roth, 1995, pp. 68-86). If the “true”
willingness to pay/accept for a lottery is in between the reported bid and ask prices,
6Table I reports descriptive statistics for the sample of 3,458 respondents
to the risky-asset question and for the sub-samples of risk-averse individ-
uals and of the risk-prone.7 The risk-averse make up the great majority
of respondents: 96 percent, in fact, set a maximum price lower than the
potential gain. The risk-prone consists of 144 individuals, of whom 125 are
risk-neutral and 19 are risk-loving. The mean reported price is 2.2 million
lire (1.8 million for the risk averse and 11.2 million for the risk prone, Panel
A), about 36% of the expected gain from the lottery. There is, however, con-
siderable heterogeneity. The value of the standard deviation is 2.7 million,
larger than the average reported price, while the 90th percentile is 5 million
lire, 100 times larger than the 10th percentile. This di¤erence in willingness
to pay translates into large di¤erences in risk aversion: the 90th percentile of
the cross-sectional distribution of the degree of absolute risk aversion is 2.5
times as great as the 10th percentile. We also report a measure of the de-
gree of relative risk aversion obtained multiplying absolute risk aversion by
household consumption expenditure. Relative risk aversion is 5.4 on average
(5.8 among the risk-averse) and ranges between 1.8 (10th percentile) and 9.8
(90th percentile), showing that there is considerable diversity in aversion to
proportional risks too.
Panel B reports summary statistics of the characteristics of the respon-
dents. The two sub-samples of risk-prone and of risk-averse consumers ex-
hibit several interesting di¤erences. The risk-averse are younger and less
well educated; they are less likely to be male, to be married, to be borne in
the North of Italy and more likely to have children.
Panel C shows summary statistics for the variables that in principle
should be a¤ected by individual preferences for risk. Strong di¤erences
emerge in type of occupation: among the risk-averse the share of self-
employed is 17.4 percent; among the risk-prone it is much higher at 29.2
percent. This ordering is reversed for public sector employees. The risk-
prone are public employees in 27 percent of cases, the risk-averse in 28 per-
the reported willingness to pay (sell) will lead to upward (downward) biased estimates of
individual risk aversion. Since our survey elicits the willingness to pay it is likely that
our individual risk aversion measures are biased upward. But experiments are silent on
whether the extent of the bias (or the di¤erence between bid and ask prices) is correlated
with some observable individual characteristics. If the bias is proportional to the reported
price and constant across individuals, our results will be una¤ected.
7Those who answered have somewhat di¤erent characteristics than non-respondents.
They are on average 6 years younger than the total sample, slightly better educated (1.3
more years of schooling) and have higher shares of male-headed households (79.8 compared
to 74.4 percent), of married people (78.9 and 72.5 percent) and are signi…cantly more likely
to have children (41.9 and 31.6 percent, respectively).
7cent. As we argue, these di¤erences are likely to re‡ect self-selection, with
more risk-averse individuals choosing safer jobs. Further, the risk averse are
less likely to have changed jobs more than twice and to be chronically ill.
On average, the risk-averse are signi…cantly less wealthy than the risk-prone
(275 million lire - 142,000 euros - of mean net worth compared with 330
million - 277,000 euros) and expect to earn lower but less variable salaries.
Finally, they have a lower share of risky asset holders (13.5 percent compared
to 36.1) but also of households holding life, health or theft insurance.
4 Predicting behavior with risk aversion: theory
Attitudes towards risk should a¤ect consumers’ willingness to take risk in a
variety of situations. In this section we review theoretical arguments for the
e¤ects of risk preferences on individuals’ behavior and then test whether our
measure of risk preferences has predictive power with respect to consumer
choices in ways consistent with theory.
4.1 Occupational choice and entrepreneurship
If di¤erent jobs di¤er not only in expected return but also in the riskiness
of those returns, individuals should sort themselves into occupations on the
basis of their risk aversion. One of the few theories of entrepreneurship, put
forward by Kihlstrom and La¤ont (1979), is indeed based on heterogeneity
in risk aversion among individuals. Since running a business is equivalent to
the choice of a risky prospect, the less risk-averse will become entrepreneurs
while the relatively risk-averse will prefer to be employees and work for a
…xed wage. Thus, heterogeneity in risk aversion may explain who becomes
an entrepreneur in a society. Understanding the role of preferences in the
decision to set up a …rm vis-à-vis other possible explanations (e.g. ability
to combine factors of production as in Lucas (1978) or access to the loan
market as in Evans and Jovanovic (1989)) is of critical relevance for policy
since if tastes for risk are innate and cannot be acquired they can potentially
be a formidable obstacle to the growth of business.
4.2 Portfolio choice
Standard portfolio theory predicts that the amount of wealth an individual is
willing to invest in risky assets depends on his degree of risk aversion. Given
the return and riskiness of the risky assets, the more risk-averse should hold
safer portfolios. Furthermore, under the conditions for the validity of the
8two-fund separation theorem, since all investors face the same distribution of
asset returns, di¤erences in portfolio composition across individuals should
only re‡ect di¤erences in their degree of risk aversion. Although the con-
ditions for the two-fund separation theorem are rather severe (see Gollier,
2001) we expect di¤erences in risk aversion across individuals to help predict
di¤erences in portfolio holdings. Besides helping understand why risky asset
holders di¤er in the share of wealth invested in risky assets, di¤erences in
risk aversion may also help explain why some do not invest at all in risky
assets (e.g. stocks). If there are …xed costs of acquiring risky assets, those
who in the absence of these costs would optimally invest little in the risky
assets - because they are strongly risk-averse - will …nd it unpro…table to
incur the …xed cost and enjoy the excess return. Thus, di¤erences in risk
aversion should also help predict who will become a stockholder and who
will not.
4.3 Insurance demand
The classical model of the demand for casualty insurance elaborated by
Mossin (1968) implies that risk-averse individuals should fully insure if in-
surance is o¤ered at fair terms. If insurance is unfair, the amount purchased
will depend on one’s degree of risk aversion: the more risk-averse will de-
mand more insurance coverage. Nevertheless, even some risk averse may
choose not to insure if departure from fairness is signi…cant. Thus, dif-
ferences in risk aversion should predict not only the amount of insurance
demand among insurance holders but also the decision to buy an insurance
policy among risk-averse consumers. [Extend to life insurance. ]
4.4 Investment in education
Like all forms of investment, that in education entails risk: in fact, compared
to accepting a current job o¤er at a known wage, the decision to obtain more
education exposes the investor to a risk of failure - because the program
may turn out more di¢cult that anticipated or because the individual later
discovers he lacks the necessary ability. He may thus lose the sum invested
(including the direct fees, the living costs and the forgone salary in the
alternative job). In addition, since the investment in education only bears
fruit after a relatively long time span, the investor also bears the uncertainty
over the market value of the degree at time of completion. Thus, the less
risk-averse individuals should be more likely to obtain higher education.
Brunello (2002) shows formally that the number of years of education a
9person optimally chooses depends negatively on absolute risk aversion.8
4.5 Migration, job change and health
The decision to migrate or to change jobs and the consumer’s health status
(in-so-far as it depends on how cautious a consumer is), all depend on one’s
attitude towards risk. Compared with staying in the area of birth, migrating
to another area or country entails undertaking a risky prospect as it implies
leaving a sure and known prospect for an unknown, though typically more
promising future. Similarly, leaving a known job and taking a new one
implies incurring new risks. Thus, one expects more risk-averse individuals
to be less likely to move and to change jobs than the risk-prone. Also,




Table II reports the results of estimating probit regressions for occupational
choice. We focus on the household head’s decision to be self-employed (…rst
two columns), to be a bona …de entrepreneur (third and fourth columns) and
to be a public sector employee (last two columns). All regressions include as
controls a second order polynomial in the age of the household head, dum-
mies for gender, education, and a full set of region of residence dummies to
account for local factors that may a¤ect job choice, such as di¤erences in
the degree of development of local …nancial markets (Guiso, Sapienza and
Zingales, 2003). In addition we include dummies for the occupation of the
household head’s father to capture any intergenerational links in occupa-
tional choice. The …rst column shows the regression for the whole sample,
which includes as explanatory variables a dummy for risk-averse consumers.
The benchmark is the group of risk-prone. The left-hand-side variable is
set equal to one if the household head is a bona …de entrepreneur, both in
manufacturing and retailing, or a professional (doctors, lawyers, etc.). Risk-
averse consumers are less likely than the risk-prone to be self-employed, and
the coe¢cient is statistically signi…cant at less than the 0.5 percent level.
The di¤erences are economically very substantial: being risk-averse rather
8Compensation for risk may thus be an additional reason why education carries a higher
return (Hartog and Vijverberg, 2001).
10than risk-prone lowers the probability of being self-employed by 9 percent-
age points, or 50 percent of the sample share of self-employed. This evidence
suggests that self-selection into occupations triggered by di¤erences in in-
dividuals’ preferences is indeed an important feature of reality, an issue to
which we return in Section 5 when we examine the correlation between the
degree of absolute risk aversion and a subjective measure of the variance
of earnings. The second column restricts the sample to risk-averse house-
holds and uses as explanatory variable our measure of absolute risk aver-
sion. Since the risk-prone group includes relatively few observations we feel
more con…dent exploiting the variability in the degree of risk aversion rather
then di¤erences in the regime of attitudes towards risk. Obviously, within
the class of risk-averse individuals those who are more strongly risk-averse
should be less likely to choose risky jobs. This is con…rmed by the estimates,
which imply a negative coe¢cient for the degree of risk aversion: increasing
absolute risk aversion by one standard deviation lowers the probability of
being self-employed by 1.4 percentage points (8 percent of the unconditional
probability).
In the third and fourth column we focus on pure business entrepreneurs,
where the amount of risk-taking is probably greater than for other cate-
gories of self-employed. Results are similar to those reported in the …rst
two columns for the self-employed: being risk-averse as compared to being
risk-prone makes it less likely to be an entrepreneur (reducing the chances
by almost 5 percentage points, or 33% of the sample mean); among the risk-
averse, those who are more risk-averse are less likely to be entrepreneurs.
These results are remarkable because the control group now includes not
only all the employees but also the remaining self-employed; this - together
with the low number of entrepreneurs in the sample (15% of the observa-
tions) - explains why we lose some precision in the estimated coe¢cients.
The …fth and sixth columns look at the probability of being a public
sector employee for the whole sample and for the sample of risk-averse in-
dividuals. Consistent with the general perception that public jobs are more
secure,9 our estimates show that risk-averse individuals are more likely than
the risk-prone to work in the public sector, though the coe¢cient is sig-
ni…cant only at the 24 percent level. Compared with the risk-prone, the
risk-averse have a 5-point higher chance of being in the public sector (cor-
responding to 18 percent of the unconditional probability). Furthermore,
9In Italy for instance, public sector employees cannot be laid o¤ except in a few extreme
circumstances of misconduct. In addition, public sector jobs provide less variable on-the-
job wages (see Guiso, Jappelli and Pistaferri, 1998).
11among the risk-averse, the probability of choosing the safer occupation is
an increasing function of the degree of risk aversion: increasing the latter
by one standard deviation raises the probability of being a public sector
employee by over 2 percentage points (about 8 percent of the sample mean),
suggesting again that risk preferences have a strong impact on job choice.
It is worth noticing that in all regressions the occupation of the father of
the household head is highly signi…cant statistically and shows a strong pos-
itive correlation with the son current occupation. Sons of entrepreneurs or
the self-employed are more likely to become themselves entrepreneurs or self-
employed and less likely to be public employees, and similarly for the sons of
public employees. The e¤ects are also very important economically: having
a self-employed father raises the chances of the son being self-employed by
11 percentage points, 61% of the unconditional mean; if he is a bona …de
entrepreneur, the chances that the son also becomes an entrepreneur are
higher by 9 percentage points and those of becoming a public employee, if
the father is one, rise by 11 points. These remarkable e¤ects are obtained
after we control for individual preferences towards risk; thus, they do not re-
‡ect intergenerational correlation in individuals ability to deal with risk but
other factors that a¤ect occupation choice, such as access to information, or
the inheritance of one’s father’s business or professional practice.....
5.2 Asset allocation
Table III shows the e¤ect of the risk attitude indicators and of the degree of
risk aversion on the ownership and portfolio share of risky …nancial assets,
i.e. private bonds, stocks and mutual funds. Second-order polynomials in
total net worth and in the level of non-asset income are added to the right-
hand-side controls which include a second order polynomial in age, dummies
for gender, education, for the region of birth and for that of residence. The
risk-averse indicator has a negative e¤ect on the risky asset ownership deci-
sion, and its coe¢cient is highly signi…cant. When estimated on the whole
sample of households, the probability of holding risky …nancial assets (…rst
column) is less than half as great among risk-averse consumers as among
the risk-prone. Compared to the latter, risk-averse investors have a 10-point
lower chance of holding risky securities, corresponding to 70 percent of the
sample mean (equal to 14.4 percent). Among risk-averse consumers (second
column), the probability of holding risky assets is a decreasing function of
our measure of absolute risk aversion, and the coe¢cient is precisely esti-
mated. A one-standard-deviation increase in absolute risk aversion lowers
the probability of holding risky assets by 1.1 percentage points (11 percent
12of the unconditional probability). The third and fourth columns report To-
bit estimates of the portfolio share of risky assets (ratio of risky to total
…nancial assets). This set of results con…rms the probit estimates: the share
invested in risky assets declines as the degree of risk aversion increases and
is lower among the risk-averse than among the risk-prone. Consistent with
the predictions of the classical theory of portfolio choice, di¤erences in risk
attitudes prove to be powerful determinants of portfolio composition.
5.3 Insurance demand
We report the estimates of the e¤ect of risk attitudes on the demand for
insurance in Table IV, separately for life, health and casualty insurance,
respectively. Standard insurance theory predicts that, provided that insur-
ance premiums depart from fair pricing, di¤erences in risk aversion should
predict both the decision to buy insurance and the amounts bought, with
more risk-averse individuals being more likely to take out insurance and to
hold more of it when they do. We test these predictions by focusing on
the sub-sample of risk-averse individuals and estimate a probit model for
whether the household has insurance and a Tobit model for the amount
of insurance purchased (i.e. the value of insurance premiums) scaled with
consumption. Second-order polynomials in wealth and income are included
among the right-hand-side variables to account for di¤erences in household
endowments and in human capital. In all cases we …nd that more-risk averse
consumers are less likely to hold insurance and that they buy less of it, and
the e¤ect is statistically signi…cant. This …nding contradicts the predictions
of the simple models of insurance demand but is not necessarily in contrast
with extended models. One possible explanation is that insurance compa-
nies are able to price-discriminate on the basis of customers’ risk aversion.
This would lead to higher premiums (which we do not observe and therefore
cannot control for) for more risk-averse consumers, who would then reduce
insurance demand. This explanation - which we consider unlikely - relies
on risk aversion being observable. Another, more convincing, explanation is
that individuals can act to self-insure against the consequences of adverse
events. This leads them to replace market insurance with self-insurance. If
market insurance is sold at highly unfair prices, while self-insurance is rela-
tively e¢cient - in the sense that one extra euro of current spending results in
a large reduction in the loss - an increase in risk aversion can reduce market
insurance and increase self-insurance. To see this, consider the static insur-
ance model and assume that the loss L is a decreasing and convex function
of the investment s in self-insurance (i.e. L0 < 0;L00 > 0). Convexity implies
13that marginal returns to self-insurance are decreasing. Let a be the market
insurance coverage, ¦ the market insurance premium, w initial wealth and p
the probability that the adverse state occurs. The consumer chooses a and
s so as to maximize expected utility :
pu(w ¡ (1 ¡ a)L(s) ¡ s ¡ a¦) +(1 ¡ p)u(w ¡s ¡ a¦) (4)
To illustrate, assume utility is exponential with absolute risk aversion
parameter µ and let ¹ > 1 be the mark-up on the fair insurance premium.
From the …rst-order conditions the following two equations relating a and s
can be obtained:
a = 1 ¡(1=µL(s))log(¹(1 ¡ p)=(1 ¡ ¹p)) (5)
[from the f.o.c. on a , call this the aa locus]
a = 1 + (1=¹pL0(s)) (6)
[from combining the f.o.c. on s and a, call this the ss locus]
Both functions are downward sloping with slopes:
da=dsjaa = (L0=µL2)log(¹(1 ¡p)=(1 ¡ ¹p)) (7)
and:
da=dsjss = ¡(L00=p¹L02) (8)
respectively. The relative slope of the two loci depends on the e¢ciency of
self-insurance (how fast the loss declines with s, i.e. on L0) and on the e¢-
ciency of market insurance, i.e. on ¹. If self-insurance is relatively e¢cient
(L0 is large in absolute terms) and market insurance is relatively ine¢cient
(¹ is large) the aa locus will be steeper than the ss locus. Notice now that
an increase in the degree of absolute risk aversion shifts the aa locus upwards
but leaves the ss locus unchanged. Thus, starting from an internal solution,
if the aa locus is steeper than the ss locus the increase in risk aversion leads
to a decline in market insurance and an increase in self-insurance. Since
we do not observe the amount of self-insurance in the data, this is picked
up by our measure of risk aversion which re‡ects substitutability between
self-insurance and market insurance.
145.4 Investment in education
We report the e¤ects of risk attitudes on the investment in education in Table
V. Our left-hand-side variable is the number of years of education an indi-
vidual has obtained. The set of controls includes a second-order polynomial
in age (or year of birth) to account for di¤erences in the return to school-
ing across di¤erent cohorts, a dummy for gender and a full set of regional
dummies to proxy for di¤erences across areas in the return to education.
In addition we insert four dummies for the educational attainment of the
father of the household head to account for intergenerational persistence in
education, …nding strong supportive evidence. As shown in the …rst column,
compared to the risk-prone, risk-averse individuals invest less in education
and the e¤ect is statistically signi…cant: being risk-averse lowers education
by almost one year, on average. Among the risk-averse those who are more
averse invest less in education and again the e¤ect is strongly signi…cant
(second column).
5.5 Moving, job changes and health status
Table VI shows the results for the decisions to migrate and change jobs and
for health status. The …rst two columns estimate a model for the probability
that an individual has moved from his region of birth to another region. In
the sample, 18.5 percent of household heads were born in a region di¤erent
from the one where they currently live. Since the regressions include a full
set of dummies for region of birth, local factors a¤ecting the decision to
move, such as labor market conditions, wage prospects in the area, etc., are
accounted for. We also control for age, gender and education. Compared to
the risk-prone, the risk-averse are less likely to have moved, but the e¤ect
is not statistically signi…cant (…rst column). The second column reports the
estimates for the restricted group of risk-averse individuals. The degree of
risk aversion has a negative and highly signi…cant e¤ect on the probabil-
ity of having moved; increasing the degree of risk aversion by one standard
deviation lowers the probability by almost 2 percentage points, or 10 per-
cent of the sample mean.10 The third and fourth columns show the results
for the propensity to change jobs. The left-hand-side variable is a dummy
10As pointed out by Daveri and Faini (1999), migration may be triggered by households’
need to diversify their sources of income, spreading income earners geographically. The
implication is that members of households (heads) that are more risk-averse will tend to
work in di¤erent geographical locations rather than bunch in the same place. We cannot
test this prediction since in our data a household groups only the individulas who live in
the same house.
15equal to 1 if the household head has changed jobs at least twice, and zero
otherwise. About 33 percent of the consumers in our sample have changed
jobs more than twice. Being risk-averse compared to being risk-prone lowers
the probability of being a job changer, but the coe¢cient is not precisely
estimated. Within the group of risk-averse individuals, however, a higher
degree of risk aversion has a negative and statistically signi…cant e¤ect on
the probability of changing jobs; a one-standard deviation increase in risk
aversion lowers the probability of taking the risks connected to changing job
by 1.4 percentage points. The last two columns report probit regressions
for the probability of being a¤ected by a chronic disease. When the total
sample is used the estimates indicate that the risk-averse are signi…cantly
less likely than the risk-prone to incur a chronic disease, with an e¤ect equal
to 18 percentage points, about 88 percent of the sample share of households
with a chronic disease. When the sample is restricted to the risk-averse, the
degree of risk aversion has moderate predictive power on health status; one
standard deviation increase lowers the probability of a chronic disease by 1
percentage point (5 percent of the sample mean).
Overall, the evidence in Tables III to VII implies that attitudes towards
risk have considerable explanatory power for several important consumer
decisions. In some cases, namely for occupational and portfolio choice, our
evidence strongly suggests that leaving out measures of risk aversion in em-
pirical analysis of household behavior is likely to be a substantial problem.
6 Risk, return and risk aversion
The results in the previous section show that risk-averse individuals tend to
undertake safer actions when they choose their occupation, invest in educa-
tion and allocate their savings, decide to move or change jobs. Choosing safer
actions means, in equilibrium, choosing prospects with a lower but more pre-
dictable payo¤. As a consequence, the more risk-averse individuals should
end up earning lower incomes, on average, than the more risk-prone. At the
same time, they should face less variable prospects and more predictable
incomes. To check these implications we exploit information available in the
1995 SHIW on the subjective probability distribution of future earnings11 to
11Four questions on income expectations were put to half of the overall sample after
excluding the retired and people not in the labor force (a total of 4,799 individuals). The
employed, the unemployed and the job seekers are asked to state, on a scale from 0 to 100,
their chances of having a job in the 12 months following the interview. Each individual
assigning a positive probability to being employed is then asked to report the minimum
and the maximum he or she expects to earn if employed, and the probability of earning
16construct a measure of expected earnings and their variance and correlate
it with consumers’ risk aversion. Since the subjective probability questions
were put to only half of the sample, these regressions are based on a much
smaller sample. For this we do not report regressions using the indicator
for being risk-averse, since very few belong to the control group of the risk-
prone, and focus instead on the sample of risk-averse consumers as such.
Table VII reports the results of the estimates. The …rst two columns show
the regression using expected earnings as a left-hand-side. We control for age
to account for experience and productivity e¤ects on wages and for gender
and family size, as well as for di¤erences in economic development (and thus
wage levels) across areas by inserting a full set of regional dummies; in the
…rst column we control for di¤erences in education. Being more risk-averse
translates into lower expected labor income, and the e¤ect is statistically
signi…cant and economically important: having a risk aversion coe¢cient
equal to the 90th percentile implies a level of expected earnings that is 6.4
million lire lower than for the 10th percentile (25% of mean expected earn-
ings). The second column shows estimates when education is excluded from
the set of explanatory variables; in fact, since the attitude towards risk af-
fects the investment in education, the dummies for education may be partly
capturing the e¤ect of risk aversion. When education is omitted the e¤ect
of risk aversion increases substantially implying that the more risk-averse
should receive earnings that are 8 million lire lower than the less risk-averse.
These results are consistent with the idea that the more risk-averse will, on
average, end up poorer. But they should also have less variable earnings.
The third column shows the regression for the variance of income. After
controlling for age, gender, education and household location, more risk-
averse consumers face lower earnings variance, and the e¤ect is highly sig-
ni…cant. Economically, those with a degree of risk aversion in the 90th
percentile of the cross-sectional distribution face an income risk, as mea-
sured by the standard deviation of expected earnings, that is 63% lower
than that of those at the 10th percentile. The last column further re…nes
these results by adding to the regression the expected value of future income
and estimating the risk/return options faced by individuals. Since expected
income represents the premium the market o¤ers for bearing more risk, once
one controls for expected earnings, risk aversion should no longer a¤ect the
variance of earnings. And this is indeed the case. Once expected earnings is
less than the midpoint of the support of the distribution. The exact wording of these
questions is reported in the appendix. The answers are then used to compute expected
earnings and their variance (see Guiso et al., 2002, for details on the computation).
17added to the regression, the coe¢cient of the degree of risk aversion becomes
six times smaller and is no longer statistically signi…cant.
7 Preferences about risk: the consequences of self-
selection
The evidence shown in the previous sections shows that risk attitudes have
important e¤ects on observable behavior and that risk-averse individuals
sort themselves into activities that entail lower exposure to risk. This self-
selection is relevant in many situations where one is interested in studying
the e¤ect of risk on choice. For instance, hours worked will in general de-
pend on wage riskiness (see Block and Heineke (1973) and Killingsworth
(1983)) and higher wage variability may reduce leisure. Similarly, precau-
tionary savings decisions will be a¤ected by the income risk faced by prudent
consumers (Leland (19xx), Drezè and Modigliani (1972)); labor income risk
may also a¤ect portfolio choice and insurance demand, inducing investors to
pick up safer portfolios or demand more insurance in order to reduce over-
all exposure to risk (Kimball (1993), Guiso, Jappelli and Terlizzese (1996),
Guiso and Jappelli (1998)). In order to assess the relevance of risk for con-
sumers’ decisions one needs variation in risk. This is often unobserved and
has thus been proxied with observable variables. Typically, since Friedman
(1958 )’s  study  of  the  consumption  function,  labor  income  risk
has been measured with occupational dummies (e.g. Skinner 19xx). More
recently, starting with the work of Guiso, Jappelli and Terlizzese (1993),
survey measures of the subjective probability distribution of future income
have been used to obtain indicators of the expected value and riskiness of an
individual’s labor income. These measures have then been used to test for
precautionary savings and for the e¤ects of background risk on insurance de-
mand and portfolio choice. The problem with these studies is self-selection:
labor income risk is endogenous, because more risk-averse individuals sort
themselves into safer occupations. If risk aversion is unobservable, estimates
of the e¤ect of labor income risk on choice will be inconsistent because the
measure of risk is correlated with the error term which contains the (unob-
served) preference parameter.
In this section we o¤er evidence on the importance of self-selection in
estimating precautionary savings by proxying risk with a dummy for self-
employment.12 We estimate a saving function based on a life-cycle model
12Fuchs and Fuchs (2003) address the relevance of self-selection for estimates of precau-
tionary saving by comparing the saving behaviour of East and West German households
18extended to allow for precautionary savings due to earnings uncertainty. If
preferences are exponential (and ignoring occupational choice) there exists
a closed form solution for the saving rate where the precautionary motive is
additive with respect to life cycle savings (Caballero, 1991). We approximate
this function as:
si = a0wi + a1yi + a2zi + a3i¾i + ui (9)
where si is household i saving, yi its labor income, wi is the household’s net-
worth and zi is a vector of demographic variables. The precautionary saving
component is captured by the fourth term on the right-hand-side where
household labor income risk, ¾i; is proxied by a dummy variable for self-
employment. The coe¢cient a3i re‡ects the strength of the precautionary
motive, as measured by the degree of absolute prudence, which if preferences
are of the CARA variety is equal to the degree of absolute risk aversion;
this is why a3i is household-speci…c. Self-selection emerges because strongly
risk-averse individuals choose safer jobs and will be less exposed to income
risk. If risk aversion is unobservable it will show up in the residual and
will bias the precautionary motive estimate downwards. Since we observe
individuals’ risk aversion we can assess the importance of the self-selection
bias in estimates of precautionary savings.
To illustrate, Table VIII shows the results of the estimates where all
variables are scaled by household earnings. The …rst column reports the
estimates when the self-selection problem is ignored. The self-employment
dummy - our proxy for labor income risk - is statistically signi…cant but
carries a negative coe¢cient. This is contrary to the precautionary savings
hypothesis but is consistent with a strong self-selection bias if risk aversion
has a strong e¤ect on individual occupational choice, as shown in Section 5.
To check whether the result is indeed driven by self-selection we interact our
measure of risk aversion (scaled by labor income) with the self-employment
dummy and use this variable as a measure of risk in the regression. The
result, shown in the second column of Table VIII, reveals a positive and
statistically signi…cant e¤ect of this risk-aversion-weighted measure of risk
consistent with the predictions of precautionary savings models. Computed
at the sample mean of risk aversion, being self-employed raises the saving
rate by 5.2 percentage points, or about 28% of the median saving rate in
after uni…cation. They argue that under Communisms, allocation to jobs in East German
was essentially exogenous and not driven by individual preferences, contrary to West Ger-
many. They compare the e¤ect of being self-employed (their proxy for earnings risk) on
the propensity to save in the two countries after uni…cation and argue that the stronger
e¤ect found for East Germany households is an estimate of the e¤ect of self-selection.
19the sample, suggesting that precautionary saving exists and is relevant, once
self-selection is properly addressed.
8 Conclusions
Theory of choice under uncertainty implies that preferences for risk should
strongly a¤ect individuals’ choices in a variety of contexts. Thus, di¤erences
in risk attitudes across individuals should be very important in explaining
observed di¤erences in behavior. In some instances, theory suggests that
di¤erences in attitudes towards risk could be the only factor a¤ecting dif-
ferences in behavior. We have used a survey-based measure of individuals’
willingness to pay for a hypothetical risky asset to construct a measure of
the Arrow-Pratt index of absolute risk aversion at the individual level. We
have then related this measure to a number of choices under uncertainty.
Our results show that this measure has a very strong predictive power on
some key consumer decisions including occupational choice, portfolio allo-
cation, investment in education, job change and moving decisions, in ways
that are consistent with what theory predicts. In some cases the e¤ects are
extremely substantial. For instance, being risk-averse as opposed to being
risk-neutral or risk-loving, raises the probability of being self-employed by
as much as 50% of the sample mean and the chances of holding risky assets
by 70% of the sample mean. Our evidence shows strongly that individuals
di¤er markedly in their attitudes towards risk and that these di¤erences
lead them to sort themselves out in such a way that the more risk-averse
choose lower returns in exchange for lower risk exposure when they invest
their assets, choose their occupation, decide to invest in education, migrate
or change jobs or to take precautions against illness. How important, then,
are di¤erences in risk aversion in explaining income inequality? One way
to answer is to look at how much of the explained variability in expected
earnings is explained by di¤erences in risk aversion compared to other fac-
tors. A regression of expected earnings on a second-order polynomial in
age, a set of dummies for place of birth and a dummy for gender explains
6.4% of the sample variability in expected earnings. Adding risk aversion ex-
plains an additional 2.2% of the sample variability, about a third of what is
explained by age, gender and area of birth! Furthermore, if dummies for fa-
ther’s occupation are included - as proxies for intergenerational transmission
of inequality - they can explain an additional 1.2 percent of the variability.
Overall, di¤erences in attitudes on risk are at least as important in explain-
ing di¤erences in average income across individuals as are such variables as
20age, gender, place of birth and family of origin, which are deemed to have a
substantial explanatory power on income levels.
21A APPENDIX
A.1 The SHIW
The Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) col-
lects detailed data on demographics, households’ consumption, income and
balance sheet items. The survey was …rst run in the mid-60s but has been
available on tape only since 1984. Over time, it has gone through a number of
changes in sample size and design, sampling methodology and questionnaire.
However, sampling methodology, sample size and the broad contents of the
information collected have been unchanged since 1989. Each wave surveys
a representative sample of the Italian resident population and covers about
8,000 households, - although at times speci…c parts of the questionnaire are
asked to only a random sub-sample. Sampling occurs in two stages, …rst at
municipality level and then at household level. Municipalities are divided
into 51 strata de…ned by 17 regions and 3 classes of population size (more
than 40,000, 20,000 to 40,000, less than 20,000). Households are randomly
selected from registry o¢ce records. They are de…ned as groups of individ-
uals related by blood, marriage or adoption and sharing the same dwelling.
The head of the household is conventionally identi…ed with the husband, if
present. If instead the person who would usually be considered the head
of the household works abroad or was absent at the time of the interview,
the head of the household is taken to be the person responsible for man-
aging the household’s resources. The net response rate (ratio of responses
to households contacted net of ineligible units) was 57 percent in the 1995
wave. Brandolini and Cannari (1994) present a detailed discussion of sam-
ple design, attrition, and other measurement issues and compare the SHIW
variables with the corresponding aggregate quantities.
A.2 Expected earnings and their variance
The variance and the expected value of individual earnings are computed as
in Guiso et al. (2002) and are based on the following questions that were
asked in the SHIW.
(i) “Do you expect to voluntarily retire or stop working in the next 12
months?”
If the answer is “Yes” the interviewer goes on to the next survey section.
If the answer is “No” each respondent is asked questions (ii) through (v)
below:
(ii) “What are the chances that in the next 12 months you will keep
your job or …nd one (or start a new activity)? In other words, if you were
22to assign a score between 0 and 100 to the chance of keeping your job or
of …nding one (or of starting a new activity), what score would you assign?
(“0” if you are certain not to work, “100” if you are certain to work).
(iii) Suppose you will keep your job or that in the next 12 months you
will …nd one. What is the minimum annual income, net of taxes and con-
tributions, that you expect to earn from this job?
(iv) Again suppose you will keep your job or that in the next 12 months
you will …nd one. What is the maximum annual income, net of taxes and
contributions, that you expect to earn from this job?
(v) What are the chances that you will earn less than X (where X is
computed by the interviewer as [(iii)+(iv)]/2)? In other words, if you were
to assign a score between 0 and 100 to the chance of earning less than X,
what score would you assign? (“0” if you are certain to earn more than X,
“100” if you are certain to earn less than X).
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27Table I: Descriptive statistics
All the variables refer to the household head, unless stated otherwise. Z denotes the amount households are willing to
invest in the risky security and is in million lira. ‘Children’ denotes the share of household with components aged
less than 18. The variables referred to the ‘father’ denote the share of households whose head has a father with 5
years of schooling or less, who is/was self-employed or a public employee. ‘Self-employed’ includes the
entrepreneurs. ‘Mover’ denotes the share of households whose head has moved from his/her region of birth. ‘Job
changer’ denotes the share of households whose head has changed jobs more than twice. ‘Chronic disease’ refers to
the share of households whose head is chronically ill. Net worth and income are in million lira. The mean of the
‘saving rate’ is computed excluding the top and bottom one percent of its distribution. ‘Risky assets’ include private
bonds, stocks and mutual funds. ‘Other insurance’ includes casualty and theft insurance. The mean and standard














Value of Z 1.82 11.19 2.21 2.71 0.05 5.0
Absolute risk aversion 0.158 -0.005 0.1507 0.05 0.08 0.20
Relative risk aversion 5.62 -0.248 5.38 3.58 1.83 9.83
B. Characteristics
Age 48.50 49.34 48.54 13.61 31 68
Male (%) 79.24 93.75 79.84  40 0 1
Married (%) 78.58 87.50 78.95 41 0 1
No. of components 3.20 3.00 3.19 1.31 1 5
Children (%) 42.12 36.11 41.87 49 0 1
Area of birth (%): North 37.69 52.78 38.32 49 0 1
                              Center 21.61 19.44 21.52 41 0 1
                              South 39.20 25.69 38.64 49 0 1
Father (%): with 5
th grade 76.67 66.67 76.26 42.56 0 1
                  self-employed 31.20 32.64 31.26 46.36 0 1
                  public employee 14.73 16.67 14.81 35.52 0 1
C. Choices
Self-employed (%) 17.38 29.17 17.87 38.32 0 1
Entrepreneur (%) 14.70 19.44 14.89 35.61 0 1
Public employee (%) 27.55 27.08 27.53 44.67 0 1
Mover (%) 18.5 18.8 18.5 39 0 1
Job changer (%) 32.38 38.89 32.65 46.90 0 1
Years of education 9.25 10.81 9.31 4.28 5 16
Chronic disease (%) 19.76 36.11 20.45 40 0 1
Household net worth 275.22 537.28 286.13 431.65 3.91 641.01
Household income 47.45 72.02 48.48 36.23 17.49 84.60
Mean saving rate (%) 13.52 19.77 13.77 33.39 -23.20 48.52
Holders of (%): risky assets 13.46 36.11 14.40 35.12 0 1
                  life insurance 21.97 37.50 22.61 41.84 0 1
                  health insurance 8.96 13.19 9.14 28.82 0 0
                  other insurance 31.11 45.83 31.72 46.55 0 1
Expected earnings:     mean 25.38 31.41 25.59 18.88 8.82 42.50
               standard deviation 1.02 1.39 1.03 2.51 0 2.04
No. of observations 3,314 144 3,458 3,458 3,458 3,45829
Table II: Risk aversion and occupation choice
“Risk-averse” is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the consumer is risk-averse, i.e. if the maximum price he/she is
willing to pay for the lottery is lower than its fair value of 10 million lire. “Absolute risk aversion” is the measure of
absolute risk aversion discussed in the text and is defined only for the risk averse. The left-hand-side variable is a
dummy equal to 1 if the household head is a self-employed (first two columns), an entrepreneur (third and fourth
column) or a public employee (last two columns). The occupation dummies under the heading ‘father’ refer to the




















Risk averse -0.3413 - -0.2156 - 0.1454 -
(0.1220) (0.1346) (0.1234)
Absolute risk aversion - -1.3636 - -0.9061 - 1.5332
(0.6112) (0.6519) (0.5752)
Age 0.0753 0.0745 0.1034 0.0983 0.0576 0.0613
(0.1666) (0.0172) (0.0186) (0.0189) (0.0123) (0.0126)
Age squared -0.0991 -0.0984 -0.1283 -0.1226 -0.0508 -0.0551
(0.0174) (0.0180) (0.0196) (0.0199) (0.0119) (0.0122)
Gender dummy 0.5730 0.5693 0.5234 0.5312 0.0610 0.0666
(0.0808) (0.0819) (0.0854) (0.0866) (0.0624) (0.0631)
High school diploma -0.1172 -0.1297 -0.3204 -0.3155 0.5880 0.6276
(0.0639) (0.0664) (0.0680) (0.0704) (0.0564) (0.0581)
University degree -0.0084 -0.0505 -1.0259 -1.1863 1.2048 1.2104
(0.0913) (0.0957) (0.1463) (0.1696) (0.0804) (0.0831)
Father:  Self-employed 0.4609 0.4607 - - -0.0427 -0.0366
(0.0580) (0.0598) (0.0551) (0.0564)
              Entrepreneur - - 0.4436 0.4520 - -
(0.0614) (0.0631)
              Public employee -0.1307 -0.1322 -0.1843 -0.1543 0.3255 0.3191
(0.0859) (0.0889) (0.0970) (0.0995) (0.0687) (0.0704)
No. of observations 3,401 3,260 3,401 3,260 3,401 3,26030
Table III: The effect of risk preferences on portfolio choice
Risky assets include stocks, private bonds and mutual funds. The left-hand-side variable for the regressions in the
first two columns is a dummy equal to 1 if the household head owns risky assets. The left-hand-side variable in the
tobit (last two columns) is the share of financial asset held in risky assets. Dummies for the region of birth and for the
region of residence are also included. Standard errors are reported in brackets.
Ownership of risky assets
(probit regressions)
Portfolio share of risky assets
(tobit regressions)
Variable Whole sample Sample or
risk-averse











Wealth - - 0.0003 0.0003
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Wealth squared - - -7.07e-08 -8.42e-08
(2.48e-08) (3.49e-08)
Income - - 0.0058 0.0066
(0.0009) (0.0011)
Income squared - - -6.13e-06 -9.28e-06
(1.64e-06) (3.03e-06)
Age 0.0531 0.0541 0.0057 0.0055
(0.0152) (0.0159) (0.0094) (0.0101)
Age squared -0.0463 -0.0471 -0.0057 -0.0051
(0.0147) (0.0155) (0.0091) (0.0098)
Gender dummy 0.2328 0.2328 0.0746 0.0707
(0.0777) (0.0793) (0.0493) (0.0511)
High school diploma 0.5897 0.5860 0.2088 0.2156
(0.0680) (0.0712) (0.0435) (0.0464)
University degree 0.9400 0.9457 0.2488 0.2389
(0.0904) (0.0945) (0.0604) (0.0648)
No. of observations 3,401 3,260 3,030 2,89731
Table IV: Risk aversion and the demand for insurance
The left-hand-side variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the household head owns a life insurance (first column),
health insurance (second column) or theft or casualty insurance (third column). The left-hand-side variables for
the tobit are the ratios of the insurance premiums to household consumption. ‘Siblings’ is a dummy equal to 1 if
the household head has any brother or sister. Dummies for the region of birth and for the region of residence are
also included. Standard errors are reported in brackets.
Ownership of insurance
(probit regressions)

















Absolute risk aversion -1.2690 -2.3851 -2.4926 -0.0642 -0.0850 -0.0594
(0.5877) (0.7377) (0.5608) (0.0396) (0.0271) (0.0160)
Wealth - - 0.00004 0.00001 0.00002
(7.22e-06) (4.62e-06) (2.97e-06)
Wealth squared - - - -4.99e-09 -9.82e-10 3.29e-09
(1.60e-09) (9.13e-10) (6.83e-10)
Income - - - 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00004)
Income squared - - - -3.32e-07 9.32e-08 -1.86e-07
(3.57e-07) (2.57e-07) (1.29e-07)
Age 0.1354 0.0657 0.0479 0.0077 0.0021 0.0003
(0.0171) (0.0205) (0.0124) (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0004)
Age squared -0.1590 -0.0794 -0.0483 -0.0096 -0.0027 -0.0005
(0.0181) (0.0212) (0.0121) (0.0013) (0.0008) (0.0004)
Gender dummy 0.2523 0.2606 0.2285 0.0073 0.0062 0.0033
(0.0704) (0.0922) (0.0633) (0.0047) (0.0033) (0.0019)
High school diploma 0.2538 0.2867 0.2451 0.0088 0.0077 0.0031
(0.0606) (0.0767) (0.0596) (0.0042) (0.0029) (0.0018)
University degree 0.3210 0.2630 0.4310 0.0010 0.0064 0.0018
(0.0862) (0.1124) (0.0858) (0.0063) (0.0045) (0.0026)
Siblings -0.0335 0.0155 -0.0197 -0.0018 0.0007 0.00003
(0.0140) (0.0188) (0.0139) (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0004)
No. of observations 3,260 3,260 3,264 3,264 3,264 3,24932
Table V: Risk aversion and the investment in education
Note: The left-hand-side variable is the number of years of schooling reported by the
household head. The education dummies under the heading ‘father’ refer to the education
attainment of the father of the household head. Dummies for the region of birth are also
included. Standard errors are reported in brackets.
Years of schooling
Variable Whole sample Sample of risk-averse
Risk averse -0.7832 -
(0.3052)




Age squared -0.0986 -0.0839
(0.0281) (0.0286)
Gender dummy 0.6801 0.6297
(0.1514) (0.1516)
Father:  Elementary school 2.6616 2.5778
(0.1465) (0.1484)
              Junior high school 4.9023 4.8881
(0.2139) (0.2184)
              High school diploma 6.6670 6.6150
(0.2550) (0.2590)
              University degree 8.3116 8.3230
(0.3757) (0.3889)
No. of observations 3,339 3,20333
Table VI: Risk aversion, moving decision, job changes and health status (chronic disease)
The left-hand-side variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the household head lives in a region different from the one
where he was born (first two columns), if he/she has changed job at least twice over his/her working life (third
and fourth column) or if he/she is affected by a chronic disease (last two columns). Dummies for the region of





















Risk averse -0.1046 - -0.1222 - -0.5788 -
(0.1346) (0.1132) (0.1194)
Absolute risk aversion - -1.7130 - -0.8853 - 0.9137
(0.5920) (0.5298) (0.6209)
Age 0.0167 0.0113 0.0277 0.0278 0.0410 0.0459
(0.0130) (0.0132) (0.0117) (0.0121) (0.0136) (0.0141)
Age squared -0.0138 -0.0080 -0.0393 -0.0400 -0.0067 -0.0113
(0.0126) (0.0128) (0.0115) (0.0120) (0.0126) (0.0131)
Gender dummy -0.1606 -0.1483 0.4094 0.4029 -0.1481 -0.1540
(0.0655) (0.0664) (0.0615) (0.0622) (0.0642) (0.0650)
High school diploma -0.0312 -0.0373 -0.2590 -0.2728 -0.0956 -0.0908
(0.0633) (0.0651) (0.0547) (0.0566) (0.0648) (0.0677)
University degree 0.2247 0.1972 -0.4484 -0.4649 -0.0136 -0.0059
(0.0863) (0.0893) (0.0840) (0.0871) (0.0907) (0.0945)
No. of observations 3,401 3,260 3,405 3,264 3,401 3,26034
Table VII: Return, risk and risk aversion
The left-hand-side variable is household expected earnings (million of lira; first two columns) and the standard
deviation of the subjective distribution of the household head expected earnings (last two columns), as from Guiso et
al. (2002). Dummies for the region of birth and for the region of residence are also included. Standard errors are
reported in brackets.
Variable Expected earnings Earnings uncertainty
Absolute risk aversion -53.60 -66.79 -7.1974 -1.3347
(12.43) (13.31) (1.8431) (1.2561)
Earning mean  - - - 0.1094
(0.0032)
Age 1.42 1.78 0.0038 -0.1521
(0.48) (0.53) (0.0717) (0.0486)
Age squared -1.47 -1.93 -0.0061 0.1550
(0.56 ) (0.62) (0.0837) (0.0567)
Gender dummy 8.56 8.07 0.6583 -0.2778
(1.51) (1.67) (0.2233) (0.1532)
High school diploma 7.54 - 0.3146 -0.5102
(1.19) (0.1766) (0.1216)
University degree 20.46 - 0.9811 -1.2573
(1.66) (0.2465) (0.1786)
Household size 1.10 0.37 - -
(0.47) (0.50 )
No. of observations 1,027 1,027 1,027 1,02735
Table VIII: Risk aversion, precautionary savings and self-selection
The left-hand-side variable is household saving rate. We exclude the top and bottom
one percent of the distribution. The sample is restricted to the risk averse. Dummies
for the region of birth and for the region of residence are also included. Standard





Self-employed head -0.0399 -
(0.0159)
Self-employed * absolute risk aversion - 0.0090
(0.0015)
Absolute risk aversion -
Age 0.0095 0.0092
(0.0029) (0.0029)
Age squared -0.0051 -0.0044
(0.0028) (0.0028)
Gender dummy 0.0445 0.0355
(0.0147) (0.0146)
High-school diploma 0.1186 0.1204
(0.0136) (0.0135)
University degree 0.2001 0.1933
(0.0197) (0.0199)
Household size 0.0223 0.0195
(0.0056) (0.0056)
Dummy for children -0.0622 -0.0575
(0.0152) (0.0152)
No. of observations 3,197 3,197